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Abstract 
We consider a firm that must undergo a costly and time-consuming regulatory process before 
making an irreversible, lagged investment whose value varies randomly. We analyze two cases: 
regulatory approval is valid forever or it expires after some time. We apply our model to Hydro-
Québec’s project of building a 1250 megawatts interconnection with Ontario.  We find that the 
firm may start the regulatory process earlier if regulatory approval is valid long enough or if 
uncertainty is high enough; it postpones it otherwise. When to start the regulatory process and 
when to invest depend on the duration of the regulatory green light. 
 
1. Introduction 
From the point of view of the firm, regulatory requirements prior to starting a project are a costly 
investment lag. Since the work of Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996), the theoretical and practical 
importance of investment lags has been increasingly acknowledged, as projects often need 
several years before they become operational. This lag is of course needed for project design, 
planning, and construction, but also to obtain the necessary regulatory approval, often for 
environmental reasons. Environmental impact assessment can be particularly long (compared to 
the building stage) for energy project such as natural gas and oil pipelines, power plants and high 
voltage transmission lines. Distinguishing between the different causes of a project lag is 
important because a firm typically has little control over the cost, the duration, and even the 
probability of success of a regulatory review. Moreover, once secured, the regulatory green light 
may be valid only for a limited time.  Thus far, these considerations appear to have received little 
attention in the economics literature on regulation.  
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The purpose of this paper is thus to analyze how the parameters of a regulatory review 
(duration, cost, and probability of success) affect the decision to invest in a simple model of 
investment under uncertainty. We consider a firm that contemplates making a lagged, 
irreversible investment, whose value varies stochastically. The firm must incur an upfront cash 
outlay to start the regulatory process, whose outcome is uncertain.  Once regulatory approval has 
been granted, we consider two possible cases: 1) it is valid forever; or 2) it expires. The firm thus 
faces a sequential investment problem, where an initial investment is required to get the option of 
investing. To ground our numerical results, we apply our model to Hydro-Québec’s recent 
project proposal to add a 1250 MW (megawatts) interconnection to the Ontario power grid.
1 
Our paper makes two contributions. First, we show that the duration of the validity of 
regulatory approval significantly impacts the decisions to start the regulatory process and to 
proceed with the project. For small durations of the regulatory approval or for low volatility, the 
firm delays starting the regulatory process, but this is reversed for long approval durations or for 
high volatility. In spite of the presence of an investment lag, the firm delays investing (once 
approval has been secured) when uncertainty increases, because we suppose that the flow of 
investment benefits admits a lower reflecting boundary. This assumption, which is common in 
the investment literature, is appropriate if there is no risk that the investment opportunity 
disappears. It seems reasonable here for our application to a power grid interconnection. These 
results underscore the need for transparent regulatory policies. 
Second, our paper is one of the few applications of real options to regulation and to 
energy projects; one exception is Chaton (2001). There is also a growing literature on electricity 
                                                 
1 This interconnection will allow Hydro-Québec to perform arbitrage operations on the Ontario electricity market 
through the use of its large hydro power sites.  
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spot prices and futures: see for example Bystrom (2003), Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) and 
Lucia and Schwartz (2002)). For transmission lines, the only study dealing with investment 
under uncertainty is by Martzoukos and Teplitz-Sembitzky (1992). Our results thus help 
understand the impact of regulations on the decision to invest under uncertainty, which is useful 
both to firms and to regulatory agencies. 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our model. In Section 
3, we apply our model to Hydro-Québec’s proposed capacity addition to the interconnection of 
the Ontario/Quebec power grid; this project is presently under review by Quebec’s 
environmental regulatory agency. Section 4 offers concluding comments and discusses some 
possible extensions. 
 
2. The  Model 
We consider a firm interested in developing a project such as a high voltage power line that 
interconnects two power grids. We suppose that before it can make the investment, the firm’s 
project is subject to regulatory proceedings (such as an environmental impact assessment) that 
take time TR and cost CR, which is sunk. Both TR and CR are assumed known for simplicity. The 
firm may start the regulatory review at any time. 
The firm cannot proceed with its project if the regulatory outcome is negative. If it is 
successful (with probability  () 0,1 q∈ ), however, the firm gains the possibility of investing a 
known, sunk amount CB to start its project, which begins yielding a flow of benefits after a  
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period TB (when construction is complete, for example).
2 For tractability, we suppose that the 
flow of net project benefits, denoted by X, follows the geometric Brownian motion (GBM): 
, dX Xdt Xdz µσ =+           ( 1 )  
where: µ>0 but µ<ρ (ρ is the relevant interest rate) in order for the present value of expected 
project benefits to be finite; σ>0; and dz is the increment of a standard Wiener process (Karlin 
and Taylor 1981). 
As emphasized by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), because of uncertainty and irreversibility, a 
standard cost-benefit approach is likely to yield incorrect decisions for the timing of the 
regulatory process and of the investment.  Here there are two sources of uncertainty: the risk of 
being turned down by the regulatory body, and the randomness of project benefits. Likewise, 
irreversibility stems from the sunk costs associated with the regulatory process and from the 
implicit assumption that, once the project is built, the firm cannot recoup its investment, CB, if it 
turns out that it made a mistake. This assumption seems especially relevant for investments in 
power lines because they typically have little residual value (basically the value of scrap metal). 
In this context, it is fruitful to formulate this problem using concepts from the theory of 
real options. Thus, we see the possibility of initiating the regulatory process as a compound 
perpetual American option (we assume that the possibility to start the regulatory process does not 
expire); if it is exercised, it gives (with probability q) the firm the option (also American) of 
building its project.
3 The firm thus needs to solve a compound stopping problem. First, let us 
                                                 
2 For simplicity, CB also includes the present value of maintenance and operation costs, which are assumed known. 
3 An American option can be exercised at any time until it expires. By contrast, a European option can be exercised 
only at maturity (i.e., at the end of its life). For more on options, see for example Wilmott, Howison, and Dewynne 
(1995).  
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analyze the decision to start the regulatory process. 
 
2.1  The decision to start the regulatory process 
It is intuitively clear that the firm should start this process when X is high enough (recall that X is 
the flow of net project benefits). The firm then exchanges the option to start the regulatory 
process for VR(X), the expected net present value of the project itself, corrected for the risk of not 
getting regulatory approval and for the cost of the regulatory process. Thus, for x “large enough,” 
() () , RR xVx Φ=           ( 2 )  
where 
() ( ) ( )
0
,, ; . R T
RR B R R Vx C q e y Tf y Tx d y
ρ
+∞
− =− + Φ ∫     (3) 
In the above, 
•  -CR is the present value of the cost to the firm of the regulatory proceedings; 
•  () 0,1 q∈  is the probability that the regulatory outcome is positive; 
•  ρ is the firm’s risk adjusted interest rate; 
•  TR is the time required to complete the regulatory process; 
•  () , B xt Φ  is the value of the option to build the project at time t and for X=x.  () . B Φ  
depends explicitly on time only if the regulatory approval expires. We adjust the time 
clock here so that the regulatory review starts at time 0; and 
•  () ,; R fy Tx  is the value at y of the probability density of  X  at  R T  time units after X=x. 
Since we assume that X follows a GBM,  () ,; R fy Tx  is the lognormal density  
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          ( 5 )  
However, the firm is better off waiting when X is “too low”. Let 
*
R x  denote the frontier 
between the high values of X for which the regulatory process should be started and the low 
values of X for which waiting is optimal. For 
* (0, ) R xx ∈ , the return on  () R x Φ  per unit of time 
should equal its expected capital gains so, after using Ito’s lemma, we find that  () R x Φ  verifies 







Fx x F x F x
σ
ρµ =+         ( 6 )  
It is easy to check that the general solution to (6) is a combination of two power 
functions: one is negative and the other is positive. Since the option term should be finite when x 
tends towards 0, we eliminate the negative power function and find 
() 0 , R xA x
θ Φ=           ( 7 )  









=>          ( 8 )  
θ >1 because we assume that  ρµ > . 
                                                 
4 This approach is correct here because we assume that X=0 is a lower reflecting boundary; see Saphores 2002.  
  7 
Since we solve simultaneously for  *
R x  and A0 in (7), we need another condition in 
addition to (2); it is the well-known “smooth-pasting” condition (Dixit and Pindyck 1994): 
() ( ) * *
0
|, , ; | . R
R R
T R
BR R xx xx
d d










∫     (9) 
Equations (2), (3), (7) and (9) enable us to find ΦR once ΦB is known. 
 
2.2  The decision to start construction 
Let us now consider the decision to build assuming that the regulatory green light has been 
obtained at time  R T . We consider two possibilities: 1) the regulatory green light is valid forever; 
and 2) it is valid only for a limited time TA. This constraint reflects the need to revisit regulatory 
approval following changes in economic, political, or environmental conditions. When the 
authorization to build expires, the firm looses the opportunity to invest. 
 
Case 1: the regulatory green light is valid forever. 
This assumption simplifies the problem. First, the option to build does not depend explicitly on 
time (it is a perpetual American option), so we denote it by  () B x Φ  instead of  () , B xt Φ . Based 
on arbitrage considerations,  () B x Φ   also verifies Equation (6) for 
* (0, ) B xx ∈  . Since  () B x Φ   
should be finite when x is close to 0, we keep only the solution of (6) which is a positive power 
function, so that (see (8) for an expression of θ) 
() 0 . B xB x
θ Φ=            ( 1 0 )  
Second, the frontier between values of X for which the firm should build and those for 
which it should wait is again independent of time since we have an autonomous problem (time  
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intervenes only through discounting). We denote this frontier by  *
B x  . As before, the firm should 
wait if X is not high enough, and it should invest immediately otherwise. Thus, for  *
B xx ≥  , the 
option to build equals  () B Vx  , the sum of building costs plus the present value of the flow of 
expected net revenues: 




() , ; . B T
BB B Vx C e P V y f y Tx d y
ρ
+∞
− =− + ∫
       ( 1 2 )  
In the above: 
•  B T  is the time required to complete the project; 
•  PV(y) is the present value of the flow of project benefits when X=y; and 
•  () ,; B fy Tx  is the value at y of the probability density function of X, TB time units after 
X=x. 
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When we insert (10) into (13) and (14) to solve for  *
B x   and for B0, we find 























           ( 1 6 )  
A comparative statics analysis shows that, as expected, 
*
B x   increases with TB,  CB and σ. 
Conversely, it decreases with µ: a faster growth rate allows the firm to start the project earlier 
and thus to discount less heavily future benefits (recall that µ<ρ). With these results, we can 
derive an equation that defines 
*
R x   implicitly ((A.7) in Appendix A). We solve it numerically. 
 
Case 2: the regulatory green light is valid only for a limited duration TA>0. 
In this case, for  [ , ] RR A tT TT ∈+ , the frontier that separates the values of X for which building is 
optimal from those for which waiting is preferable depends explicitly on time; we denote it by 
()
*
B xt . Again, it is optimum for the firm to start building X is high enough, and to wait 
otherwise. Thus, for  ()
*
B xxt ≥  at  [ , ] RR A tT TT ∈+  , the value of the option to build equals the 
sum of the present value of costs plus the present value of the expected flow of project revenues. 
So, 
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As for  () R x Φ , the return per unit of time for  () , B xt Φ  should equal its expected capital 
gains. Time now intervenes explicitly in  () , B xt Φ  so, when we apply Ito’s lemma, we obtain the 
second order, linear partial differential equation, valid for  [ , ] RR A tT TT ∈+  and for  ()
*
B xxt ≤ : 













∂Φ ∂Φ ∂ Φ
Φ= + +
∂∂ ∂
    (19) 
Moreover, we know from Saphores (2002) that a lower barrier, even when it is unattainable (i.e., 
it cannot be reached in finite time), can be important for the decision to invest. We thus assume 




,, l i m 0 .
B










       ( 2 0 )  
Finally, at time TR+TA, when the option to build expires, ΦB is exercised on the basis of a simple 
cost-benefit analysis since the firm no longer has the flexibility to delay the project. Thus, 
()
() ()
() , m a x 0 , .
B T
RA
BR A R A B
XT T e




Φ+ + =− + 
−  
   (21) 
Equations (17) to (21) fully define  () , B Xt Φ . Since there is no explicit solution for  () , B Xt Φ , 
we solve numerically using finite difference methods (see Appendix B). 
 
2.3  The deterministic case 
To better assess the impact of uncertainty on the decision to invest, let us now examine the 
deterministic case. Since σ=0 in Equation (1), a simple integration shows that the flow of project 
benefits increases at a constant rate: 
() () 0. t Xt X e
µ =           ( 2 2 )   
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In this situation, if the project is worthwhile, the firm starts building as soon as regulatory 
approval has been secured because waiting would just reduce discounted net revenues. A limit in 
the duration of the regulatory green light is thus irrelevant here. Let T1 be the time at which the 
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−    
    (23) 
We suppose again that µ<ρ because otherwise waiting forever would be optimal.  Solving the 
corresponding necessary first order condition for an interior solution (T1>0), we find 
()






















        ( 2 4 )  
() R T
RB Cq C e
ρ ρ
− +  represents annualized project costs and  ()
() ( ) 0 RB TT qX e
ρµ −− +  is the value  of 
the flow of project benefits at the end of the construction phase if X=X(0) at T1. Both costs are 
expressed in $ at the start of the regulatory process. When we combine (24) and (22) to get the 
value of X at which the regulatory process should start, we see that T1 is simply the time 





















=          ( 2 5 )  
Finally, inserting (24) into (23), we find that Q*, the optimal net profit of the firm, is 
                                                 
5 For the stochastic problem, the decision to start the regulatory process does not depend explicitly on time but on 
the level of X; we don’t know what value X will have at a given time in the future, so we start the clock when the 
firm starts the regulatory process. By contrast, in the deterministic case, the firm knows perfectly how X changes 
over time and it can immediately make all necessary decisions.  


















     ( 2 6 )  
A comparative statics analysis shows that: 
•  T1 is an increasing function of CR,  CB,  TB, and ρ. Indeed, with higher regulatory or 
construction costs, the project is initially less attractive so the firm waits until project 
benefits increase over time. A longer time to build has the same impact because it reduces 
the present value of project benefits. Similarly, a higher discount rate decreases future 
benefits more than project costs since these are incurred upfront. 
•  T1 is a decreasing function of q and µ. This also makes sense intuitively: as the 
probability of regulatory success increases, so does the value of the project and the firm 
acts earlier. Likewise, if X increases faster, the firm acts earlier as the discount rate is 
larger than the growth rate (ρ>µ). 
•  Interestingly, however, T1 first decreases and then increases as TR, the time to complete 











<  − 
), a small increase in the length of the regulatory process leads to 
a slight discount of future project benefits but this effect is more than offset by the 
increase in project benefits (µ>0); acting sooner is therefore optimal. The reverse is true 
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•  Finally, for obvious reasons, Q* is a decreasing function of CR, CB, TR, TB, and ρ, and an 
increasing function of q and µ. 
 
3.  Application to the decision to build a power line 
3.1 Data 
We apply our model to one of Hydro-Québec’s (HQ) recent project proposals (1998) to build a 
1250 MW interconnection in the Outaouais region.  This interconnection would unable HQ, a 
Quebec-owned utility, to link Quebec’s transmission line network to Ontario’s and to the other 
networks connected to Ontario’s power grid (they include western New York and Michigan). 
Two reasons are given to justify the proposed investment.  First, this interconnection 
would insure a more secure electricity supply for Quebec.  HQ’s domestic production and 
transmission capacity is concentrated, which makes it vulnerable to catastrophic events.  Access 
to Ontario could provide additional supply to Quebec in case of a domestic breakdown.  
Second, the interconnection would provide more exchange opportunities in the 
deregulated wholesale electricity market of Ontario.  HQ’s main activity would be to import 
electricity when outside power prices are low.  Water supplies in hydroelectric complexes would 
be used to export electricity when outside prices are high.
6  For this illustration, we focus on the 
commercial aspects of the project because the assessment of the value of an additional supply 
source in the case of an emergency adds further complex issues that are not addressed here. 
                                                 
6 Most of HQ’s production capacity is hydroelectric.  Because this technology is flexible, HQ can easily adjust its 
production, which is not the case for producers in Ontario and in parts of United States; they rely on thermal (fossil 
and nuclear fuels) power plants.  
  14 
According to Report 143 of the “Bureau d’Audiences Publiques sur l’Environnement” 
(BAPE), HQ estimates that it would take two years (TB=2) and approximately 185 million dollars 
(CB=185) to build the interconnection.
7  Before HQ can invest, however, it must go through an 
environmental regulatory process to obtain approval.  According to the Quebec Ministry of 
Natural Resources (QMNR) which supervises HQ’s operations, this process can take as long as 
two years (TR=2) and cost approximately 2 million dollars (CR=2).  The QMNR does not want to 
speculate on the probability of success for this kind of proposal (note that this project is currently 
under review), so we assume here that HQ has a 50% chance of getting approval (q=0.5). 
Four more parameters are needed: the discount rate ρ; the infinitesimal growth rate µ and 
the variance parameter σ for  X ; and the expiry time of the regulatory approval TA.  For ρ, the 
QMNR estimates that for this type of investment, HQ requires a 10% annual rate of return.  In 
BAPE’s Report 143, HQ does not detail its revenues from arbitrage activities (it is private 
information), so it is not possible to construct a time series for  X  in order to estimate µ and σ.  
We thus choose an arbitrary but plausible value for µ of 2% per year, and we vary σ between 
0.15 and 0.8 per  year . 
Finally, the QMNR gives no official expiry time for the regulatory approval.  However, if 
HQ waits too long before investing, the QMNR can force HQ to undergo another regulatory 
review.  To round up the list of parameters for our base case, we suppose that TA equals 7 years. 
Since there is some substantial uncertainty concerning the value of some of our model 
parameters, we conduct an extensive sensitivity analysis.  We consider the following parameter 
values:  q∈{0.25, 0.5, 0.75}; TA∈{3, 5, 7, 10, +∞}, in years; CR∈{1, 2, 4}, in $ million; 
                                                 
7 All $ amounts in this paper are in Canadian dollars.  
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CB∈{150, 185, 220}, in $ million; and µ  ∈{0.01, 0.02, 0.044}, per year, in addition to 
systematically varying σ between 0.15 and 0.8 per  year . 
 
3.2 Results 
Our main results are summarized on Figures 1 to 3.  We are particularly interested in how 
uncertainty combines with the regulatory parameters (q, CR, and TA) to influence the optimal 
regulatory threshold  *
R x . 
Figure 1 illustrates how  *
R x  varies with the volatility in net arbitrage revenues, σ, for 
three different values of the probability of regulatory approval, q. As for the deterministic case, 
we observe that, as q increases,  *
R x  decreases. It is interesting to note, however, that  *
R x  is not a 
monotonic function of σ: initially it increases and then it decreases as σ increases; this is more 
apparent for higher values of q. To understand this result, take the logarithm of X; from Ito’s 




µ −  and variance  2 σ . A 






µ −< ), so it is optimal for the firm to act earlier. 
The same phenomenon is apparent when we analyze 
*
R x  for different values of the cost of 
the regulatory process, CR, or of the duration of the regulatory process, TR (these results are not 
shown). As for the deterministic case, when CR increases, so does 
*
R x : the firm needs to wait for 
a larger value of the benefits flow before the project is worthwhile. For the range of parameters 
explored here, 
*
R x  decreases when TR increases: as for the deterministic case, for “small” values  
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of TR, a small increase in the length of the regulatory process discounts slightly future project 
benefits but this effect is more than offset by the increase in project benefits so acting sooner is 
optimal. In addition, the difference between the  *
R x s for different values of CR or of TR increases 
with σ, just as it does for different values of q: uncertainty thus exacerbates errors if q, CR or TR 
are known imperfectly. Moreover,  *
R x  is consistently above the deterministic threshold  *
0 R x , for 
smaller values of σ. If uncertainty is ignored in that case, the regulatory process is thus started 
prematurely. 
Figure 2 shows how the duration of the validity of regulatory approval, TA, affects 
*
R x . 
We observe that for σ given, as TA decreases 
*
R x  increases: as the firm has a smaller window of 
opportunity to invest, it waits for a more attractive potential payoff. In addition, while the action 
threshold to start the regulatory process first increases with σ (before decreasing when 
uncertainty is large enough),  *
R x  is monotonically decreasing when TA =+∞ for the range of 
variances considered: assuming that TA =+∞ when it is finite, even large (e.g., TA =10 years), 
may thus lead to sub-optimum decisions. 
Figure 3 illustrates the variations of the optimal threshold to start investment  *
B x  with 
uncertainty for different values of TA. Of course,  *
B x  depends neither on TR,  CR, nor on q. 
Whereas  *
R x  is a concave function of σ that first increases and then decreases when uncertainty 
is large enough, 
*
B x  is convex increasing. Indeed, a higher volatility increases both the incentive 
to wait and the opportunity cost of not investing because the risk of small values for X is 
bounded from below: our assumption that X admits a lower reflecting barrier guarantees that a  
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higher level of uncertainty will lead to potentially higher payoffs.
8 This explains that our results 
differ from the findings of Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) because they consider a lower absorbing 
barrier where the project is abandoned. Our results also show that their findings depend more on 
the nature of the lower absorbing barrier than on the existence of investment lags (on the 
importance of barriers when investing, see Saphores 2002). In addition, we note that 
*
B x  
increases with TA: when the regulatory green light lasts longer, the firm can invest at higher 
levels of the flow of benefits. 
Finally, our sensitivity analysis (results not included here) shows that both 
*
R x  and 
*
B x  
decrease when µ  increases, although they both vary relatively little when µ changes from 0.01 to 
0.03 per year. In addition, both 
*
R x  and 
*
B x  decrease with CB and increase with TB. The intuition 
for these results is the same as for the deterministic case. 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we extend a simplified version of Bar-Ilan and Strange’s model (1996) to analyze 
the optimal decisions of a firm that needs to undergo a costly and time-consuming regulatory 
review in order to make a lagged, irreversible investment whose value varies randomly.  Our 
numerical application to Hydro-Québec’s proposal to build a 1250 megawatts interconnection to 
the Ontario power grid shows that the decision to start the regulatory review and the decision to 
start the project after regulatory approval has been secured vary quite differently with 
uncertainty. Indeed, the first one is a non-monotonic, concave function of uncertainty, while the 
                                                 
8 McDonald and Siegel (1986), for example, also obtain this result but they do not make clear that it depends on a 
hidden assumption regarding the nature of the zero boundary.  
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second is an increasing convex function of uncertainty; both are sensitive to the duration of the 
regulatory green light. These results underscore the need for transparent regulatory proceedings. 
They are a first step towards understanding the impact of regulatory requirements such as 
environmental impact assessments on the decision to invest. 
Future research could consider a number of extensions, including: stochasticity in the 
duration and/or the cost of the regulatory process (i.e., TR and/or CR are random); alternative 
stochastic processes for X; uncertainty in building costs (i.e., CB stochastic); and a general 
equilibrium analysis of the impact of environmental impact assessments.  In addition, it would be 
instructive to model construction in details along the lines suggested in Majd and Pindyck (1987) 
or Milne and Whalley (2000).  Finally, as more information becomes available and as 
deregulated electricity markets stabilize, it would be very useful to estimate actual arbitrage 
revenues from interconnecting power grids. 
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Appendix A: Implicit Equation for  *
B x   
 
*
B x   is the value of X above which construction should start when regulatory approval is valid 
forever ( A T =+ ∞). We first derive an expression for VR(x) that incorporates (15) and (16). As 
emphasized above,  () 0 B xB x θ Φ=   is valid only for  * (0, ) B xx ∈  . For  *
B xx ≥  , construction should 










  (see (13)). Thus, if the 
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         ( A . 2 )  
where  () ,; R fy Tx  is the lognormal distribution given by (4). After the change of variables 

















 in (A.2), we obtain 
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     (A.3) 
Φ(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Thus,  

















      ( A . 4 )  
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   (A.5) 
Combining (A.1), (A.4), and (A.5) leads to: 
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−    =− + − − + −   −  
 (A.6) 
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      ( A . 7 )  
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      ( A . 8 )  
φ(.) is the standard normal density function.  
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Appendix B: Numerical Solution of  () , B xt Φ  
 
To obtain  *
R x , we first need to approximate  () , B xt Φ .  Following Wilmott, Howison and 
Dewynne (1995) and Saphores (2000), we transform Equations (17) to (21) by making the 
change of variables: 
() ( ) 2
2
, ,  , , ,
zz




+ == − Φ =      (B.1) 
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=+ −  
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        ( B . 3 )  
where 
()
() () () ( )
2 11 1
14 1 1
42 2 ,m a x 0 , .
B kw k zk z T
hz e e e
τρ µ
τ




    (B.4) 
The initial condition is 
()()
() () ( )
11
11
22 ,0 ,0 max 0, .
B kz kz T
uz hz e e
ρµ −+ − − 
 == −+
 
     (B.5) 
Because of the lower reflecting barrier at X=0, we also need:  
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      ( B . 6 )  
In addition, to prevent arbitrage opportunities, the following constraint is required: 
()
() () () ( )
2 11 1
14 1 1
42 2 ,m a x 0 , .
B kw k zk z T
uz e e e
τρ µ
τ




    (B.7) 
Finally, u  and  uz ∂∂  must be continuous at  ()
*
B zzτ = . 




















−≥ − ≥   ∂ ∂ 

 ∂∂ 
−⋅ − =   ∂ ∂  
       ( B . 8 )  
Both expressions in the first part of (B.8) are equalities at the free boundary. 
We solve the above problem using the Crank-Nicholson finite difference scheme and the 
projected successive over-relaxation (PSOR) algorithm (see Wilmott, Howison and Dewynne 
1995) with  0.01 z δ = ; a grid for z with  1400 N− =  and  800 N+ = ; and time steps equivalent to 
3 days.  Details are available from the authors.  To obtain the option value function, we reverse 
the change of variables. 
Once we have an approximation of  () ,0 B x Φ , we combine the continuity and smooth-
pasting conditions to approximate 
*
R x .  Taking their ratio, we find that 
*









θ =          ( B . 9 )  
We use the bisection method to find the zero of (B.9).  













Figure 1:  *
R x  versus σ for different probabilities of regulatory success. 
 
Notes: Results above are generated with TB=2 years, CB=$185 million, TR=2 years, CR=$ 2 





























Figure 2:  *
R x  versus σ for different durations of the regulatory authorization. 
 
Notes: Results above are generated with TB=2 years, CB=$185 million, TR=2 years, CR=$2 
million, q=0.5, µ=0.02 per year, and ρ=0.1 per year. TA is the duration of the regulatory green 
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Figure 3:  *
B x  versus σ for different durations of the regulatory authorization. 
 
Notes: Results above are generated with TB=2 years, CB=$185 million, µ=0.02 per year, and 
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